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ABSTRACT
An atomic cross-chain swap is a distributed coordination task where
multiple parties exchange assets across multiple blockchains, for
example, trading bitcoin for ether.
An atomic swap protocol guarantees (1) if all parties conform to
the protocol, then all swaps take place, (2) if some coalition deviates
from the protocol, then no conforming party ends up worse o,
and (3) no coalition has an incentive to deviate from the protocol.
A cross-chain swap is modeled as a directed graph D, whose
vertexes are parties and whose arcs are proposed asset transfers. For
any pair (D,L), whereD = (V ,A) is a strongly-connected directed
graph and L ⊂ V a feedback vertex set for D, we give an atomic
cross-chain swap protocol for D, using a form of hashed timelock
contracts, where the vertexes in L generate the hashlocked secrets.
We show that no such protocol is possible if D is not strongly
connected, or if D is strongly connected but L is not a feedback
vertex set. e protocol has time complexityO(diam(D)) and space
complexity (bits stored on all blockchains) O(|A|2).
1 MOTIVATION
Carol wants to sell her Cadillac for bitcoins. Alice is willing to buy
Carol’s Cadillac, but she wants to pay in an “alt-coin” cryptocur-
rency. Fortunately, Bob is willing to trade alt-coins for bitcoins.
Alice, Bob, and Carol need to arrange a three-way swap: Alice will
transfer her alt-coins to Bob, Bob will transfer his bitcoins to Carol,
and Carol will transfer title of her Cadillac to Alice1. Of course, no
one trusts anyone else. How can we devise a protocol that ensures
that if all parties behave rationally, in his or her own self-interest,
then all assets are exchanged, but if some parties behave irrationally,
then no rational party will end up worse o?
In many blockchains, assets are transferred under the control
of so-called smart contracts (or just contracts), scripts published
on the blockchain that establish and enforce conditions necessary
to transfer an asset from one party to another. For example, let
H (·) be a cryptographic hash function. Alice might place her alt-
coins in escrow by publishing on the alt-coin blockchain a smart
contract with hashlock h and timelock t . Hashlock h means that if
Bob sends the contract a value s , called a secret, such that h = H (s),
then the contract irrevocably transfers ownership of those alt-coins
1Naturally, they live in a state that records automobile titles in a blockchain.
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from Alice to Bob. Timelock t means that if Bob fails to produce
that secret before time t elapses, then the escrowed alt-coins are
refunded to Alice.
Here is a simple protocol for Alice, Bob, and Carol’s three-way
swap, illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Let ∆ be enough time for one
party to publish a smart contract on any of the blockchains, or
to change a contract’s state, and for the other party to detect the
change.
• Alice creates a secret s , h = H (s), and publishes a contract
on the alt-coin blockchain with hashlock h and timelock
6∆ in the future, to transfer her alt-coins to Bob.
• When Bob conrms that Alice’s contract has been pub-
lished on the alt-coin blockchain, he publishes a contract
on the Bitcoin blockchain with the same hashlock h but
with timelock 5∆ in the future, to transfer his bitcoins to
Carol.
• When Carol conrms that Bob’s contract has been pub-
lished on the Bitcoin blockchain, she publishes a contract
on the automobile title blockchain with the same hashlock
h, but with timeout 4∆ in the future, to transfer her Cadil-
lac’s title to Alice.
• When Alice conrms that Carol’s contract has been pub-
lished on the title blockchain, she sends s to Carol’s con-
tract, acquiring the title and revealing s to Carol.
• Carol then sends s to Bob’s contract, acquiring the bitcoins
and revealing s to Bob.
• Bob sends s to Alice’s contract, acquiring the alt-coins and
completing the swap.
What could go wrong? If any party halts while contracts are being
deployed, then all contracts eventually time out and trigger refunds.
If any party halts while contracts are being triggered, then only
that party ends up worse o. For example, if Carol halts without
triggering her contract, then Alice gets the Cadillac and Bob gets a
refund, so Carol’s misbehavior harms only herself.
e order in which contracts are deployed maers. If Carol were
to post her contract with Alice before Bob posts his contract with
Carol, then Alice could take ownership of the Cadillac without
paying Carol.
Timelock values maer. If Carol’s contract with Bob were to
expire at the same time as Bob’s contract with Alice, then Carol
could reveal s to collect Bob’s bitcoins at the very last moment,
leaving Bob no time to collect his alt-coins from Alice.
What if parties behave irrationally? If Alice (irrationally) reveals
s before the rst phase completes, then Bob can take Alice’s alt-
coins, and perhaps Carol can take Bob’s bitcoins, but Alice will not
get her Cadillac, so only she is worse o.
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Figure 1: Atomic cross-chain swap: deploying contracts
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Figure 2: Atomic cross-chain swap: triggering arcs
A atomic swap protocol guarantees (1) if all parties conform to the
protocol, then all swaps take place, (2) if some parties deviate from
the protocol, then no conforming party ends up worse o2, and (3)
no coalition has an incentive to deviate from the protocol. Alice,
Bob, and Carol’s swapping adventure suggests broader questions:
when are atomic cross-chain swaps possible, how canwe implement
them, and what do they cost?
While swapping digital assets is the immediate motivation for
this study, atomic cross-chain swap protocols have other possi-
ble applications. Sharding [7] splits one blockchain into many for
beer load-balancing and scalability. Most of the time, activities
on dierent shards proceed independently. When they cannot, an
atomic swap protocol can coordinate needed cross-chain updates.
2Other than the inconvenience of having assets temporarily locked up.
In a decentralized distributed system, upgrades from one soware
version to another, or from one data schema to another, could bene-
t from atomic cross-chain swaps. An atomic swap protocol can be
thought of as a trust-free, Byzantine-hardened form of distributed
commitment [26]. An atomic cross-chain swap is a special case
of a distributed atomic transaction [25], although not all atomic
transactions can be expressed as cross-chain swaps.
Cross-chain swaps are well-known to the blockchain commu-
nity [4, 6, 9, 20, 21, 27], but to our knowledge, this is the rst
systematic analysis of the theory underlying such protocols. We
make the following contributions. A cross-chain swap is modeled
as a directed graph (digraph) D, whose vertexes are parties and
whose arcs are proposed asset transfers. For any pair (D,L), where
D = (V ,A) is a strongly-connected digraph and L ⊂ V a feedback
vertex set forD, we give an atomic cross-chain swap protocol using
a form of hashed timelock contracts, where the vertexes in L, called
leaders, generate the hashlocked secrets. (Vertexes that are not lead-
ers are followers.) We also show that no such protocol is possible
if D is not strongly connected, or if D is strongly connected but
the set of leaders L is not a feedback vertex set. e protocol has
time complexity O(diam(D)) and communication complexity (bits
published on blockchains) O(|A| · |L|).
2 MODEL
2.1 Digraphs
A directed graph (or digraph)D is a pair (V ,A), whereV is a nite set
of vertexes, and A is a nite set of ordered pairs of distinct vertexes
called arcs. We use V (D) for D’s set of vertexes, and A(D) for its
set of arcs. An arc (u,v) has head u and tail v . An arc leaves its
head and enters its tail. An arc (u,v) enters a set of vertexesW ⊆ V
if u <W and v ∈W , and similarly for leaving.
A digraph C is a subdigraph ofD ifV (C) ⊆ V (D),A(C) ⊆ A(D)
and every arc in A(C) has both its head and tail in V (C).
A path p in D is a sequence of vertexes (u0, . . . ,u`) such that
u0, . . . ,u`−1 are distinct. Path p has length `, denoted by |p |. If v
is a vertex, and (u0, . . . ,u`) a path that does not include the arc
(v,u0), thenv +p denotes the path (v,u0, . . . ,u`). For vertexesu,v ,
D(u,v) is the length of the longest path from u to v in D.
A path (u0, . . . ,u`) is a cycle if u0 = u` . A digraph is acyclic if
it has no cycles. Vertex v is reachable from vertex u if there is a
path fromu tov . D’s diameter diam(D) is the length of the longest
path from any vertex to any other. D is connected if its underlying
graph is connected, and strongly connected if, for every pair u,v
of distinct vertexes in D, u is reachable from v and v is reachable
from u. A feedback vertex set is a subset of V whose deletion leaves
D acyclic.
e transpose DT is the digraph obtained from D by reversing
all arcs. If D is strongly connected, so is DT , and any feedback
vertex set for D is also a feedback vertex set for DT .
2.2 Blockchains and Smart Contracts
For our purposes, a blockchain is a distributed service that allows
clients to publish transactions to a publicly-readable, tamper-proof
distributed ledger. Our analysis is independent of the particular
blockchain algorithm. We assume a timing model where there is a
known duration ∆ long enough for one party to publish a contract
to a blockchain, and for a second party to conrm that the contract
has been published.
e owner of an asset (such as a unit of cryptocurrency or an
automobile title) can create a smart contract to transfer ownership
of that asset to a counterparty if specied conditions are met. A
contract is published when its creator places it on a blockchain
ledger. Once a contract is published, it is irrevocable: neither the
contract’s creator nor any other party can remove the contract nor
tamper with its terms.
A rational party acts in its own self-interest, deviating from a
protocol only if it is protable to do so. Rational parties can collude
with one another to disadvantage other parties. An irrational party
may deviate from a protocol even if it is not protable to do so.
Parties may behave irrationally out of spite, because they were
hacked, or because they prot in ways not foreseen by the protocol
designers.
Blockchain protocols typically require parties to have public and
private keys. We use sig(x ,v) to denote the result of v using its
private key to sign x .
3 SWAP DIGRAPHS AND GAMES
A cross-chain swap is given by a digraph D = (V ,A), where each
vertex in V represents a party, and each arc in A represents a pro-
posed asset transfer from the arc’s head to its tail via a shared
blockchain. (We assume without loss of generality that D is con-
nected, because a disconnected digraph can be treated as multiple
swaps.) Henceforth, we use party and vertex, blockchain and arc,
interchangeably, depending on whether we emphasize roles or
digraph structure.
In the terminology of game theory, a swap D is a cooperative
game, organized so that if all parties follow the protocol, each
transfer on each arc happens. Each possible outcome is given by
a subdigraph E = (V ,A′) of D. If a proposed transfer (u,v) ∈ A is
also in (u,v) ∈ A′, then that transfer happened. For short, we say
arc (u,v) was triggered.
A protocol is a strategy for playing a game: a set of rules that
determines which step a party takes at any stage of a game. To
model real-world situations where multiple parties are secretly
controlled by a single adversary, the swap game is cooperative:
parties can form coalitions where coalition members commit to a
common strategy.
Deal
NoDeal
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FreeRide
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betterworse
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Figure 3: Partial order of protocol outcomes
Here are the outcomes for a party v , organized into classes, For
brevity, each class has a shorthand name.
• e party acquires assets without paying: at least one arc
entering v is triggered, but no arc leaving v is triggered
(FreeRide).
• e party acquires assets while paying less than expected:
all arcs enteringv are triggered, but at least one arc leaving
v is not triggered (Discount).
• e party swaps assets as expected: all arcs entering and
leaving v are triggered (Deal).
• No assets change hands: no arc entering or leaving v is
triggered (NoDeal).
• e party pays without acquiring all expected assets: at
least one arc entering v is not triggered, and at least one
arc leaving v is triggered (Underwater).
Payos for a coalition C ⊂ V are dened by replacing v with C in
the denitions above.
e protocol design incorporates certain conservative assump-
tions about parties’ preferences. e protocol’s preferred outcome
is for all conforming parties to end with outcome Deal. In the pres-
ence of failures or deviation, however, it is acceptable for conform-
ing parties to end with outcome NoDeal, the status quo, rendering
them no worse o. Furthermore, each party is assumed to prefer
Deal to NoDeal, because otherwise it would not have agreed to
the swap in the rst place. It follows that each party prefers any
FreeRide outcome to NoDeal, because it acquires additional assets
“for free”, without relinquishing any assets of its own. Similarly,
each party prefers any Discount outcome to Deal, since that party
acquires the same assets in both outcomes, but relinquishes fewer
in Discount outcomes. For these reasons, Deal, NoDeal, Dis-
count, and FreeRide are all considered acceptable outcomes for
conforming parties if the protocol execution is unable to complete
because of failures or adversarial behavior.
We consider the remaining Underwater outcomes to be unac-
ceptable to conforming parties. It is possible that in some idiosyn-
cratic cases, a party may actually prefer particular Underwater
outcomes to NoDeal. For example, a party with three entering arcs
and one leaving arc may be be willing to relinquish its asset in re-
turn for acquiring only two out of three of the entering arcs’ assets.
We leave the design of protocols that make such ne distinctions
to future work.
Denition 3.1. A swap protocol P is uniform if it satises:
• If all parties follow P, they all nish with payo Deal.
• If any coalition cooperatively deviates from P, no conform-
ing party nishes with payo Underwater.
A uniform protocol is not useful if rational parties will not follow
it. A swap protocol is a strong Nash equilibrium strategy if no coali-
tion improves its payo when its members cooperatively deviate
from that protocol.
Denition 3.2. A swap protocol P is atomic if it is both uniform
and a strong Nash equilibrium strategy.
is denition formalizes the notion that if all parties are rational,
all swaps happen, but if some parties are irrational, the rational
parties will never end up worse o. Recall that a conforming party
follows the protocol, while a deviating party does not.
Lemma 3.3. If D is strongly connected, then any uniform swap
protocol P is atomic.
Proof. If a deviating coalition C ⊂ V achieves a beer payo
than Deal, then that payo is either in FreeRide or Discount.
It follows that some arc that enters C is triggered, and some arc
that leaves C is untriggered. Moreover, if any arc that enters C is
untriggered, then all arcs that leave C are untriggered.
A conforming party v < C cannot end up Underwater, so if
an arc entering v is untriggered, then every arc leaving v must be
untriggered, and if an arc leaving v is triggered, then every arc
entering v must be triggered.
Let (c,v) be an untriggered arc leavingC . Since v is conforming,
every arc leavingv is untriggered. BecauseD is strongly connected,
there is a path (v,v0), (v1,v2), . . . , (vk , c0) where each vi < C , and
c0 ∈ C . By a simple inductive argument, each arc in this path is
untriggered, so the arc (vk , c0) that entersC is untriggered, so every
arc leaving C must be untriggered, and some arc entering C must
be triggered.
Let (v, c) be a triggered arc entering C . Since v is conforming,
every arc entering v is triggered. Because D is strongly connected,
there is a path (c1,v0), (v0,v1), . . . , (vk , c) where each vi < C , and
c1 ∈ C . By a simple inductive argument, each arc in this path is
triggered, so the arc (c1,v0) leaving C is triggered, contradicting
the fact that every arc leaving C is untriggered. 
Lemma 3.4. If D is not strongly connected, then no uniform swap
protocol is atomic.
Proof. Because D is not strongly connected, it contains ver-
texes x ,y such that y is reachable from x , but not vice-versa. Let Y
be the set of vertexes reachable from y, and X the rest: X = V \ Y .
X is non-empty because it contains x . Because y is reachable from
x , there is at least one arc from X to Y , but no arcs from Y to X .
CoalitionX can improve its payo by triggering all arcs between
vertexes inX , but no arcs fromX toY , yielding payo FreeRide for
X , since it triggers strictly fewer arcs leaving X , without aecting
any arcs entering X . In fact, the payo for each individual vertex
in X is either the same or beer than Deal. 
We have just proved:
Theorem 3.5. A uniform swap protocol for D is atomic if and
only if D is strongly connected.
Informally, if D is not strongly connected, then rational parties
will deviate from any uniform protocol. In practice, such a swap
would never be proposed, because the parties in X would never
agree to a swap with the free riders in Y . Henceforth,D is assumed
strongly connected.
We remark that eorem 3.5 relies on the implicit technical
assumption that all value transfers are explicitly represented on
some blockchain. is theorem would be falsied, for example, if
Carol responds to learning Alice’s secret by sending a large drone
to drop her Cadillac in the middle of Alice’s driveway, without ever
recording that transfer in a shared blockchain. We will assume that
if swaps have o-chain consequences, as they typically do, that
those consequences are explicitly recorded in the form of blockchain
updates.
4 AN ATOMIC SWAP PROTOCOL
4.1 Hashlocks and Hashkeys
In a simple two-party swap, each party publishes a contract that
assumes temporary control of that party’s asset. is hashed time-
lock contract [5] stores a pair (h, t), and ensures that if the contract
receives the matching secret s , h = H (s), before time t has elapsed,
then the contract is triggered, irrevocably transferring ownership
of the asset to the counterparty. If the contract does not receive the
matching secret before time t has elapsed, then the asset is refunded
to the original owner. For multi-party cross-chain swaps, we will
need to extend these notions in several ways.
1 contract Swap {
2 Asset asset ; /∗ asset to be transferred or refunded ∗/
3 Digraph digraph; /∗ swap digraph ∗/
4 address[] leaders ; /∗ leaders ∗/
5 address party ; /∗ transfer asset from ∗/
6 address counterparty ; /∗ transfer asset to ∗/
7 uint [] timelock ; /∗ vector of timelocks ∗/
8 uint [] hashlock; /∗ vector of hashlocks ∗/
9 bool[] unlocked; /∗ which hashlocks unlocked? ∗/
10 uint start ; /∗ protocol starting time ∗/
11 /∗ constructor ∗/
12 function Swap (Asset asset ; /∗ asset to be transferred or refunded ∗/
13 Digraph digraph ; /∗ swap digraph ∗/
14 address[] leaders ; /∗ leaders ∗/
15 address party ; /∗ transfer asset from ∗/
16 address counterparty ; /∗ transfer asset to ∗/
17 uint [] timelock ; /∗ vector of timelocks ∗/
18 uint [] hashlock ; /∗ vector of hashlocks ∗/
19 uint start /∗ protocol starting time ∗/
20 ) {
21 asset = asset ; /∗ copy ∗/
22 party = party ; counterparty = counterparty ; /∗ copy ∗/
23 timelock = timelock ; hashlock = hashlock ; /∗ copy ∗/
24 unlocked = [ false , …, false ]; /∗ all unlocked ∗/
25 }
Figure 4: Swap contract (part one)
In the three-way swap recounted earlier, each arc had a single
hashlock and a single timeout. Timeouts were assigned so that the
timeout on each arc entering a follower v was later by at least ∆
than the timeout on each arc leaving v . is gap ensures that if any
arc leaving v is triggered, then v has time to trigger every entering
arc.
If a swap digraph has only one leader, vˆ , then the subdigraph
of its followers is acyclic. As in our three-way swap example, the
hashlock on arc (u,v) can be given timeout (diam(D) + D(v, vˆ) +
1) · ∆, where D(v, vˆ) is the length of the longest path from v to the
unique leader vˆ . (See le-hand side of Figure 6.)
is formula does not work if a swap digraph has more than one
leader, because the subdigraph of any leader’s followers has a cycle,
and it is not possible to assign timeouts across a cycle in a way that
guarantees a gap of at least ∆ between entering and leaving arcs.
(See right-hand side of Figure 6.)
Instead, for general digraphs, we must replace timed hashlocks
with a more general mechanism, one that assigns dierent timeouts
to dierent paths. Pick a set L = {v0, . . . ,v`} of vertexes, called
leaders, forming a feedback vertex set for D. Each leader vi gener-
ates a secret si and hashlock value hi = H (si ), yielding a hashlock
vector (h0, . . . ,h`), which is assigned to every arc.
A hashkey for h on arc (u,v) is a triple (s,p,σ ), where s is the
secret h = H (s), p is a path (u0, . . . ,uk ) in D where u0 = v and uk
is the leader who generated s , and
σ = sig(· · · sig(s,uk ), . . . ,u0),
the result of having each party in the path sign s . A hashkey (s,p,σ )
times out at time (diam(D) + |p |) · ∆ aer the start of the protocol.
at hashkey unlocks h on (u,v) if it is presented before it times
out. An arc is triggered when all of its hashlocks are unlocked. A
hashlock has timed out on an arc when all of its hashkeys on that arc
have timed out. Figure 7 shows partial hashkeys for a two-leader
swap digraph.
4.2 Market Clearing
For simplicity, assume the swap digraph is constructed by a (pos-
sibly centralized) market-clearing service, which perhaps commu-
nicates with the parties through its own blockchain. e clearing
service is not a trusted party, because the parties can check the
consistency of the clearing service’s responses.
Each party creates a secret s and matching hashlock h = H (s). It
sends the clearing service its hashlock, along with an oer charac-
terizing the swaps it is willing to make. e service combines these
oers, and publishes a swap digraph D = (V ,A), a vector L ⊂ V
of leaders forming a feedback vertex set, a vector of those leaders’
hashlocks h0, . . . ,h` , and a starting time T , at least ∆ in the future.
26 function unlock ( int i , uint s , Path path, Sig sig ) {
27 require (msg.sender == counterparty ); /∗ only from counterparty ∗/
28 if (now < start + (diam(digraph) + |path |) ∗ ∆ /∗ hashkey still valid ? ∗/
29 && hashlock[i] == H(s) /∗ secret correct ? ∗/
30 && isPath(path, digraph, leader [ i ], counterparty) /∗ path valid ? ∗/
31 && verifySigs ( sig , s , path) { /∗ signatures valid ? ∗/
32 unlocked[i ] = true ;
33 }
34 }
35 function refund () {
36 require (msg.sender == party ); /∗ only from party ∗/
37 if (any hashlock unlocked and timed out) {
38 transfer asset to party ;
39 halt ;
40 }
41 }
42 function claim () {
43 require (msg.sender == counterparty ); /∗ only from counterparty ∗/
44 if (every hashlock unlocked) {
45 transfer asset to counterparty ;
46 halt ;
47 }
48 }
49 }
Figure 5: Swap contract (part two)
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If all parties conform to the protocol, all contracts will be trig-
gered before T + 2 · diam(D) · ∆, but if some parties deviate, the
conforming parties’ assets will be refunded by then.
ABC
ݏ஺,BA
ݏ஺,BCA
ݏ஻,B
ݏ஺,A
ݏ஻,AB
ݏ஻,ACB
ݏ஺,CA
ݏ஺,CBA
ݏ஻,CB
ݏ஻,CAB
ݏ஺,BA
ݏ஺,BCA
ݏ஻,B
ݏ஺,CA
ݏ஺,CBA
ݏ஻,CB
ݏ஻,CAB
ݏ஺,A
ݏ஻,AB
ݏ஻,ACB
secret	ݏ஺,
݄஺ ൌ ܪሺݏ஺ሻ
secret	ݏ஺,
݄஺ ൌ ܪሺݏ஺ሻ
Figure 7: Hashkey paths for arcs of two-leader digraph
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Figure 8: Concurrent contract propagation for two-leader digraph
4.3 Contracts
Figures 4 and 5 show pseudocode3 for a hashed timelock swap
contract. A smart contract resembles an object in an object-oriented
programming language, providing long-lived state (Lines 2-9), a
constructor to initialize that state (Lines 12-25), and one or more
functions to manage that state (Lines 26-48).
e contract’s long-lived state records the asset to be transferred
or refunded (Line 2), the digraph D (Line 3), the digraph’s set
of leaders (Line 4), the party transferring the asset (Line 5), the
3 is pseudocode is based loosely on the popular Solidity programming language for
smart contracts [24].
counterparty receiving the asset (Line 6), a vector of timelocks
(Line 7), a vector of hashlocks (Line 8), and a Boolean unlocked
vector marking which hashlocks have been unlocked (Line 9).
When the contract is initialized, its constructor copies the elds
provided into the contract’s long-lived state (Lines 21-23) and sets
each entry in unlocked to false (Line 24).
e unlock () function (Line 26), callable only by the counterparty
(Line 27), takes an index i , a secret si , a path p, and the signature
sig . e hashlock hi is unlocked if
• the current time is less thanT +(diam(D)+ |p |)·∆ (Line 28),
• hi = H (si ) (Line 29),
• p is a path in D from the counterparty to the leader who
generated si (Line 30), and
• the signature is the result of signing si by the parties in p
(Line 31)
e refund () function (Line 35), callable only by the party, re-
funds the asset to the party if any unlocked hashlock has timed out.
e claim () function (Line 42), callable only by the counterparty
(Line 36), transfers the asset to the counterparty if all hashlocks
have been unlocked.
4.4 Pebble Games
We analyze the protocol using two variations on a simple pebble
game. We are given a strongly-connected digraph D = (V ,A), and
a vertex feedback set L ⊂ V of leaders.
In the lazy pebble game, start by placing pebbles on the arcs
leaving each leader. Place new pebbles on the arcs leaving vertex v
when there is a pebble on every arc entering v .
In the eager pebble game, start by placing a single pebble on one
vertex z. Place new pebbles on the arcs leaving v when there is a
pebble on any arc entering v . Both games continue until no more
pebbles can be placed.
Lemma 4.1. In the lazy game, every arc in D eventually has a
pebble.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction, the game stops in a
state where an arc (u,v) has no pebble. ere must be a pebble-
free arc (u ′,u) entering u, because otherwise the game would have
placed a pebble on (u,v). Continuing in this way, build a longer
and longer pebble-free path until it becomes a pebble-free cycle.
But leaders form a feedback vertex set, so every cycle inD includes
a leader, and the arcs leaving that leader have pebbles placed in the
rst step. 
Lemma 4.2. In the eager game, every arc in D eventually has a
pebble.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction, the game stops in
a state where an arc (u,v) has no pebble. Because G is strongly
connected, there is a path from z to v . Since z has a pebble and
v does not, there is an arc (w,w ′) on that path where w has a
pebble but w ′ does not, so w ′ will get a pebble in the next step,
contradicting the hypothesis that the game has stopped. 
Suppose there is a worst-case delay ∆ between when the last
pebble is placed on any arc entering v , and when the last pebble is
placed on any arc leaving v .
Lemma 4.3. In both pebble games, every arc will have a pebble in
time at most diam(D) · ∆ from when the game started.
Proof. For the lazy game, it is enough to show that in each
interval of time ∆, the longest pebble-free path shrinks by one. At
any time aer the rst step, let a0, . . . ,ak be a pebble-free path of
maximal length. at path cannot be a cycle, because then it would
include a leader, who would have placed a pebble on a0 in the rst
step. It follows that every arc entering the head of a0 must have a
pebble, because otherwise we could construct a longer pebble-free
path. By hypothesis, within time ∆, a0 will have a pebble, and the
path will have shrunk by one.
For the eager game, it is enough to observe that in each interval
of time ∆, for every vertex v , the number of unpebbled vertexes
in every path from z to w shrinks by one. Because D is strongly
connected, such a path always exists. 
Corollary 4.4. Under the stated timing assumptions, for both
games, every arc has a pebble within time diam(D) · ∆.
4.5 e Protocol
ere are two phases. In Phase One, instances of the Swap contract
(Figures 4 and 5) are propagated through D, starting at the leaders.
Each time a party observes that a contract has been published on
an entering arc, it veries that contract is a correct swap contract,
and abandons the protocol otherwise.
Here is the Phase-One protocol for leaders:
(1) Publish a contract on every arc leaving the leader, then
(2) wait until contracts have been published on all arcs enter-
ing the leader.
Here is the protocol for followers:
(1) wait until correct contracts have been published on all arcs
entering the vertex, then
(2) publish a contract on every arc leaving the vertex.
Figure 7 shows how contracts are propagated in a swap digraph
with two leaders.
In Phase Two, the parties disseminate secrets via hashkeys.
While contracts propagate in the direction of the arcs, from party to
counterparty, hashkeys propagate in the opposite direction, from
counterparty to party. Informally, each party is motivated to trigger
the contracts on entering arcs to acquire the assets controlled by
those contracts.
We now trace how the secret si generated by leader vi is propa-
gated. At the start of the phase, vi calls unlock(si ,vi , sig(si ,vi )) at
each entering arc’s contract (here, the function’s arguments are the
hashkey, andvi is a degenerate path). e rst time any other party
v observes that hashlock hi on a leaving arc’s contract has been un-
locked by a call to unlock(si ,p,σ ), it calls unlock(si ,v+p, sig(σ ,v))
at each entering arc’s contract. e propagation of si is complete
when hi has either timed out or has been unlocked on all arcs.
Lemma 4.5. If all parties conform to the protocol, then every arc
has a contract within time diam(D) · ∆ of when the protocol started.
Proof. Phase One is an instance of the lazy pebble game on D,
so the claim follows from Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3. 
Lemma 4.6. If all parties conform to the protocol, then every arc’s
contract is triggered within time 2 · diam(D) · ∆ of when the protocol
started.
Proof. Each secret’s dissemination is an instance of the eager
pebble games on DT , the transpose digraph. e secrets are dis-
seminated in parallel. 
Theorem 4.7. If all parties conform to the protocol, then every
contract is triggered within time 2 · diam(D) · ∆ of when the protocol
started.
e deadline 2 · diam(D) · ∆ bounds the time assets can be held
in escrow when things go wrong. In practice, one would expect
actual running times to be shorter.
ere is a simple optimization that ensures that Phase Two com-
pletes in constant time when all parties conform to the protocol. We
use a shared blockchain, perhaps that of themarket-clearing service,
as a broadcast medium. Each leader vi publishes its secret si on
the shared blockchain, and each follower monitors that blockchain,
triggering its entering arcs when it learns the secret. (Logically, we
create an arc from each follower directly to that leader.) Unfortu-
nately, while this broadcasting blockchain can “short-circuit” the
Phase Two protocol, it cannot replace it, because a deviating leader
might refrain from publishing the secret on that blockchain, but
publish it on others. (Miller et al. [18] propose a similar optimization
for the Lightning network.)
Lemma 4.8. If hashlock h times out on any arc entering a conform-
ing v , then h must have timed out on every arc leaving v .
Proof. Suppose h was triggered on (v,w) by hashkey (s,p,σ ).
If v does not appear in p, then v + p is a path from v to the leader,
and v can immediately trigger h on (u,v) using the hashkey (s,v +
p, sig(σ ,v)), which has not timed out. If v appears in p, then v has
already received (and signed) a hashkey that triggersh on (u,v). 
Theorem 4.9. No conforming party ends up Underwater.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that some conforming
party v ends up Underwater: a leaving arc (v,w) has a triggered
contract, but an entering arc (u,v) does not and will not.
First, arc (u,v) must have a contract. Suppose v is a leader.
Since (v,w) has been triggered, v has revealed its secret through a
hashkey. But a leader issues hashkeys in Phase Two only aer a
contract has been published on every entering arc during Phase One.
Suppose insteadv is a follower. Since (v,w) has been triggered, one
of the arcs leaving v has a contract. But in Phase One, a follower
publishes a contract on a leaving arc only aer contracts have been
published on all of its incoming arcs.
Since (u,v) has a contract, one of that arc’s hashlocks must have
timed out. By Lemma 4.8, the arc (v,w) must also have timed out,
a contradiction. 
Theorem 4.10. For D = (V ,A) with leaders L ⊂ V , the space
complexity, measured as the number of bits stored on all blockchains,
is O(|A|2).
Proof. ere are |A| contracts, one on each arc, each with a
copy of the digraph D, which requires O(|A|) storage. 
Finally, any atomic cross-chain swap protocol using hashed time-
locks must assign secrets to a feedback vertex set.
Lemma 4.11. In any uniform hashed timelock swap protocol, no
follower v can publish a contract on an arc leaving v before contracts
have been published on all arcs entering v .
Proof. If follower v has has a contract on arc (v,w) but no
contract on arc (u,v), then the parties other thanv could collude to
trigger the contract on (v,w), while refusing to publish a contract
on (u,v), leaving v Underwater. 
Theorem 4.12. In any uniform swap protocol based on hashed
timelocks, the set L of leaders is a feedback vertex set in D.
Proof. Suppose, instead, there is a uniform swap protocol where
the leaders do not form a vertex feedback set.
At any step in the protocol, the waits-for digraphW is the subdi-
graph of DT where (v,u) is an arc ofW if (u,v) has no published
contract. Informally, Lemma 4.11 implies thatv must be waiting for
u to publish a contract on (u,v) before u can publish any contracts
on its own outgoing arcs. In the initial state, if D \ L contains a
cycle, so doesW . At each protocol step, a follower v can publish a
contract on a leaving arc only if v has indegree zero in the current
waits-for digraph. But no vertex on a cycle in the waits-for digraph
will ever have indegree zero, a contradiction. 
4.6 Single-Leader Digraphs
As noted, in the common special case where a swap digraph needs
only one leader, we can replace hashkeys with simple timeouts,
reducing message sizes and eliminating the need for digital signa-
tures. In the following, letD be a swap digraph with a single leader
vˆ with hashlock h.
Lemma 4.13. If each arc (u,v) has timeout (diam(D) + D(v, vˆ) +
1) ·∆, then for every conformingv , vˆ , the timeout on each arc (u,v)
is later by at least ∆ than the timeout on each arc (v,w).
Proof. Let p be the longest path fromw to the leader vˆ . Because
the subdigraph of followers is acyclic, v + p is a path of length
D(w, vˆ) + 1 from v to vˆ , so D(v, vˆ) ≥ D(w, vˆ) + 1. 
Lemma 4.14. For a single-leader digraph using timeouts, if hashlock
h times out on any arc entering a conforming v , then h must have
timed out on every arc leaving v .
Proof. By Lemma 4.14, once h is triggered on (v,w), v has time
at least ∆ to trigger (u,v). 
From this point on, the bounds on running time and proofs of
safety for the single-leader-using-timeouts protocol are essentially
the same as for the general protocol.
5 REMARKS
We have seen that single-leader swap digraphs do not require
hashkeys and digital signatures, only timeouts. Is there a way
to reduce the use of digital signatures in the general case?
Finding a minimal feedback vertex set forD is NP-complete [15],
although there exists an ecient 2-approximation [3].
e protocol is easily extended to a model where there may be
more than one arc from one vertex to another, so-called directed
multi-graphs [2], reecting the situation where Alice wants to trans-
fer assets on distinct blockchains to Bob.
e swap protocol is still vulnerable to a weak denial-of-service
aack where an adversarial party repeatedly proposes an aractive
swap, and then fails to complete the protocol, triggering refunds,
but temporarily rendering assets inaccessible. We leave for future
work the question whether one could require parties to post bonds,
and following a failed swap. examine the blockchains to determine
who was at fault (by failing to execute an enabled transition).
An interesting open problem is the extent to which this swap
protocol can be modied to provide beer privacy, analogous to
the way the Bolt network [12] improves on Lightning.
As noted, some parties may be willing to accept certain Un-
derwater outcomes rejected by the swap protocol presented here.
Future work might investigate protocols where parties are endowed
with customized objective functions to provide ner-grained con-
trol which outcomes are acceptable.
e swap protocol can be made recurrent by having the leaders
distribute the next round’s hashlocks in Phase Two of the previous
round. If swaps are recurrent, then it would be useful to conduct
swaps o-chain as much as possible, similar to the way that Light-
ning [22] and Raiden [19] networks support o-chain transactions
for bitcoin and ERC20 tokens.
One limitation of the swap protocol presented here is the as-
sumption that the swap digraph, its leaders, and their hashlocks are
common knowledge among the participants. Future work might
address constructing and propagating this information dynamically.
6 RELATEDWORK
e use of hashed timelock contracts for two-party cross-chain
swaps is believed to have emerged from an on-line discussion fo-
rum in 2016 [4, 20]. ere is open-source code [6, 9, 21] for two-
party cross-chain swap protocols between selected currencies, and
proposals for applications using swaps [27].
O-chain payment networks [8, 12, 19, 22] circumvent the scala-
bility limits of existing blockchains by conducting multiple transac-
tions o the blockchain, eventually resolving nal balances through
a single on-chain transaction. e Revive network [16] rebalances
o-chain networks in a way that ensures that compliant parties do
not end up worse o. ese algorithms also use hashed timelock
contracts, but they address a dierent set of problems.
Multi-party swaps arise when matching kidney donors and re-
cipients. A transplant recipient with an incompatible donor can
swap donors to ensure that each recipient obtains a compatible
organ. A number of algorithms [1, 10, 13] have been proposed for
matching donors and recipients. Shapley and Scarf [23] consider
the circumstances under which certain kinds of swap markets have
strong equilibriums. Kaplan [14] describes a polynomial-time algo-
rithm that given a set of proposed swaps, constructs a swap digraph
if one exists. ese papers and many others focus on “the clearing
problem”, roughly analogous to constructing a swap digraph, but
not on how to execute those swaps on blockchains.
e fair exchange problem [11, 17] is a precursor to the atomic
cross-chain swap problem. Alice has a digital asset Bob wants, and
vice-versa, and at the end of the protocol, either Alice and Bob have
exchanged assets, or they both keep their assets. In the absence of
blockchains, trusted, or semi-trusted third parties are required, but
roles of those trusted parties can be minimized in clever ways.
A atomic cross-chain transaction is a distributed task where a
sequence of exchanges occurs at each blockchain. An atomic cross-
chain swap is an atomic cross-chain transaction, but not vice-versa,
because not all transactions can be expressed as swaps. In our
original example, Alice could not borrow bitcoins from Bob to
pay Carol, because then Alice would have to execute two steps in
sequence (borrow, then spend) instead of executing a single swap.
A beer understanding of atomic cross-chain transactions is the
subject of future work.
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